

Workshop on Collective Responsibility, Joint Action, and Participation

Program

10:15-10:30 Coffee

10:30-11:15 John Horty (Maryland, US): *Epistemic Oughts in stit Semantics*

11:15-11:45 Coffee break

11:45-12:30 Allard Tamminga (Groningen and Utrecht, Netherlands): *Collectivism versus Individualism: Two Formal Results*

12:30-13:30 Lunch

13:30-14:15 Olivier Roy (Bayreuth, Germany): *Shared Intentions, Loose Groups, and Pooled Knowledge*

14:15-15:00 Natalie Gold (Oxford, UK): *Team Reasoning and the Rational Choice of Payoff-Dominant Outcomes in Games*

15:00-15:30 Coffee break

15:30-16:15 Jan Broersen (Utrecht, Netherlands): *From the achievement stit (and the deliberative stit) to the interventionist stit*

16:15-17:00 Hein Duijf (Utrecht, Netherlands): *Let's do it! Collective Responsibility, Joint Action, and Participation*

17:00-18:00 drinks

Abstracts

John Horty: “Epistemic Oughts in stit Semantics”

TBA

Allard Tamminga: “Collectivism versus Individualism: Two Formal Results”

Are collective duties reducible to individual ones? To be more precise: Does it hold that for every sentence about collective duties there is a logically equivalent sentence about possibilities, individual actions, and individual duties? We show, using techniques from modal logic (bisimulation, expressivity), that the answer is negative. Rather than **arguing** that methodological individualism is false, we **prove** that it is false in the multi-modal logic that is built from an alethic possibility operator, operators for individual agency, and operators for individual and collective deontic optimality. We give truth-conditions for the sentences of this language in terms of deontic game models. Although the resulting logic is sufficiently strong to define Horty-style individual and collective duties, we show by way of an expressivity proof that this logic does not allow for a definition of collective deontic optimality in terms of all the other constituents of the language.

Olivier Roy: “Shared Intentions, Loose Groups, and Pooled Knowledge” (Joint work with Anne Schwenkenbecher, Murdoch University)

We study shared intentions in what we call loose groups. These are groups that lack a codified organizational structure, and where the communication channels between group members are either unreliable or not completely open. We start by formulating two desiderata for shared intentions in such groups. We then argue that no existing account meets these two desiderata, because they assume either too strong or too weak an epistemic condition, that is a condition on what the group members know and believe about what the others intend, know, and believe. We propose an alternative, pooled knowledge, and argue that it allows formulating conditions on shared intentions that meet the two desiderata.

Natalie Gold: “Team Reasoning and the Rational Choice of Payoff-Dominant Outcomes in Games”

Standard game theory cannot explain the selection of payoff-dominant outcomes that are best for all players in common-interest games. Theories of team reasoning can explain why such mutualistic cooperation is rational. They propose that teams can be agents and that individuals in teams can adopt a distinctive mode of reasoning that enables them to do their part in achieving Pareto-dominant outcomes. We show that it can be rational to play payoff-dominant outcomes, given that an agent group identifies. We compare team reasoning to other theories that have been proposed to explain how people can achieve payoff-dominant outcomes, especially with respect to rationality. Some authors have hoped that it would be possible to develop an argument that it is rational to group identify. We identify some large—probably insuperable—problems with this project and sketch some more promising approaches, whereby the normativity of group identification rests on morality.

Jan Broersen: “From the achievement stit (and the deliberative stit) to the interventionist stit”

I will critically review the achievement stit and the deliberative stit and will propose a generalisation of both in the form of the interventionist stit. The work presented is ongoing research, and no formal results have been obtained yet.

Hein Duijf: “Let’s Do It: Collective Responsibility, Joint Action, and Participation”

What is the relation between collective blameworthiness and individual blameworthiness? Do responsibility voids exist? That is, are there cases where the group is collectively responsible for a certain outcome while no group member bears any individual responsibility? To answer these questions, I have built on two central ideas and provided a systematic study of this relation. First, to analyse collective and individual responsibility it is vital to distinguish between member and individual responsibility. After all, what I ought to do as an independent individual may significantly differ from what I ought to do as a member of a particular group. Second, I relied on the idea that different modes of acting – causally, knowingly, and intentionally – are relevant for assessing the levels of culpability. To aid and guide my theorizing, the practice of formal modelling is vital, that is, I try to provide mathematical models that are intended to represent relevant features and their interplay. To cash out these two ideas I rely on ideas from philosophy, economics, and artificial intelligence. My aim is to clarify the conditions for responsibility voids by systematically studying the interplay between various concepts, like action, knowledge, and intention. The two central ideas help provide a detailed basis for studying the relation between collective decisions and individual decisions.
