

Formalizing the Causal Conditions for Moral Responsibility

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The past two decades have seen substantial progress on formalizing the concept of actual causation, aka token causation. This concept is of fundamental importance for the attribution of moral responsibility for some outcome to an agent. Yet there is almost no work that translates the insights gained in the formal causation literature to the problem of moral responsibility. In this talk I present a formalization of two necessary conditions that are required for moral responsibility, both of which involve causation. The first condition focusses on the causal relation between an agent's act and the outcome, the second condition focusses on the agent's *beliefs* regarding that causal relation. The discussion of these conditions will turn out to be very helpful in comparing several proposals for defining causation. The result will be a partial definition of moral responsibility for an outcome that relies on a variant of the NESS definition of causation.